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Abstract   The ethical landscape surrounding the introduction of autonomous 
vehicles is complex, and there are real concerns over whether the operational 
safety of these systems can be adequately demonstrated. In this paper we focus 
on the ethical factors relevant to the design and safety justification of autonomous 
systems, considering issues such as risk transfer, ALARP considerations, capa-
bility vs risk trade-RIIVDQGHPHUJHQWEHKDYLRXUV:HORRNEH\RQGWKH³WUROOH\
SUREOHP´ WRFRQVLGHUKRZGHVLJQGHFLVLRQVFDQ reflect a wider ethical frame-
work. We also look at the wider landscape around the emergence of autonomous 
systems, with a particular focus on the driving social factors which encourage 
early adoption of new technologies in this domain. We present some arguments 
for encouraging an explicit discussion of social and ethical factors within the 
safety framework for autonomous systems. 
1 Introduction 
Autonomous systems (AS) have been proposed for use in multiple domains, in-
cluding nuclear, medical, defence, rail, maritime and automotive. The ethical re-
quirements across each of these domains will inevitably differ, and in many cases 
there is no consensus as to which system behaviours would be deemed ethically 
appropriate. The SCSC Safety of Autonomous Systems Working Group 
(SASWG) has been engaged in producing guidance on the safety of autonomous 
systems, and this paper constitutes a summary of our current position on ethics. 
We note that ethics considerations do not relate solely to safety, and a discus-
sion of AS ethics may include environmental impact, economics, manufacturing 
processes and adequate financial investment. While we consider these as 
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influencing factors, detailed analysis of these aspects is beyond the scope of the 
SCSC SASWG and therefore of this paper.  
2 Ethical background 
The first ethical question we introduce relates to the position of humans in the 
decision-making process. When we move from human actors to automated ones, 
we move the intelligence in the decision from conditions which are potentially 
subject to extreme time stress to a much calmer, slower-paced environment. That 
is, the way in which the AS reacts is determined by the programming and algo-
rithm decisions, made by developers during the design and implementation 
stages. (This excludes the possibility of AS which use dynamic machine learning, 
as such systems may reasonably be assumed to be infeasible in the short-term 
future).  
This may raise the standard of ethical performance the public expects. For 
example, in the case of a human driver, any decisions made in a collision situation 
are judged according to that environment and drivers ± except where their actions 
have been negligent ± are generally not considered culpable should they make 
WKH³ZURQJ´GHFLVLRQ/LQ7KLVLVDOVRVHHQLQWKHPLOLWDU\GRPDLQZLWK
regards to the rules of engagement, and discussed further in Section 2.3. An en-
gineer developing an AS, by contrast, is not under such pressure, and may there-
fore be expected to ensure that the AS reacts in a societally acceptable way, re-
gardless of how a human actor might.  
More generally, there is the question of risk acceptability. It is not clear that 
the general public will necessarily be willing to accept the same risk when it is 
posed by a machine as opposed to a person. To some stakeholders, ASs may be 
acceptable only when they represent a significant decrease in risk compared to 
human actors. Consent to the risk presented by a system, and the extent to which 
this risk can be justified, is discussed in more detail in Section 3. In order to 
provide examples for this, we present a comparison below of the primary ethical 
concerns in some of the identified domains. This is not intended to be an exhaus-
tive discussion of ethics in each of these fields, for which the interested reader is 
referred to existing literature. 
2.1 Automotive 
The automotive domain is one in which the ethical aspects can be perhaps most 
readily characterised, with the primary concern being framed in terms of the 
³WUROOH\SUREOHP´7KLVUHIHUVWRDWKRXJKWH[SHULPHQWLQZKLFKDWUDLQWUROOH\LV
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on a set of tracks which will cause it to collide with a number of people. The 
observer is asked whether s/he would choose to switch the train to a second set 
of tracks which will cause it to collide with a single person only. Amendments 
and extensions to the trolley problem have couched the problem in terms of an 
active vs. passive choice as well as experimented with the relDWLYH³ZRUWK´RI
each person affected. 
 
Fig. 1. The trolley problem (McGeddon, 2016) 
The automotive domain also presents some further ethical questions. In (Lin, 
2015) a case is discussed whereby an autonomous vehicle (AV) may choose to 
position itself within a lane closer to a smaller car than to a truck. This decision 
might be justified in two ways: firstly, that this behaviour is typical of a human 
driver, and secondly that this reduces the risk to the AV. From a safety perspec-
tive, this decision has prioritised the safety of the AV occupants ± and the truck 
occupants ± over that of the smaller car. Such a decision would need to be justi-
fied within the safety case and from an ethical perspective. 
Alternatively, the AV may take the opposite course; choosing to drive closer 
to, or to impact, a heavier vehicle or a vehicle with safety systems known to be 
better. In this case the severity of an accident may be reduced, compared to an 
impact with a vehicle with poor safety systems. However, implementing such a 
decision into the behaviour of the AV represents a deliberate choice to increase 
the risk to drivers of certain vehicles and must be justified ethically. Other situa-
tions discussed in the existing literature include the decision of an AV to sacrifice 
itself (place itself in the path of another vehicle to save a third party from impact), 
as well as choosing to impact a motorcyclist wearing a helmet over one not wear-
ing such protective devices (Gerdes and Thornton 2016). 
The automotive domain, among others, is also subject to commercial pres-
sures. There is significant public interest in self-driving cars, and engineering 
FRPSDQLHVDUHDOHUWWRWKHDGYDQWDJHRIEULQJLQJRXWWKH³ILUVWRINLQG´RIDQ$9
The high-profile nature of commercial AVs can encourage the categorisation of 
safety as a competitive advantage. This means that best practice can be difficult 
to establish, and known problems may not be shared for reasons of commercial 
interest. 
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In addition, there are currently no applicable standards which fully address the 
safety of AVs, including safety of the intended function (ISO 26262 2011). Con-
sequently, while there is a clear economic and reputational imperative for a com-
SDQ\WREULQJRXWWKH³ILUVWRINLQG´LQDXWRQRPRXVYHKLFOHVLWLVPXFKOHVVFOHDU 
that such an AV could be demonstrated to be acceptably safe. There is a risk that 
WKHSXVKWRSURGXFHDQGPDUNHW$9VFDQHQFRXUDJH³TXLFNDQGGLUW\´SUDFWLFHV
during the development lifecycle which can have an effect on the system as re-
leased to the public. While standards do exist around ethical design of systems 
(IEEE Global Initiative 2016), these are relatively new and their general applica-
bility has not been fully determined. 
2.2 Medical 
There are a significant number of ethical concerns in the medical domain, which 
we will not attempt to discuss exhaustively here. Unlike the automotive domain, 
ethics in the medical domain typically do not involve trolley problems. Rather, 
medical ethics problems tend to relate to the trading off of risk for medical ben-
efit, or Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY). While these decisions are not spe-
cific to ASs, a question remains around the ability of such systems to adequately 
judge the quality of life, as well as the willingness of the public to accept such a 
decision made by a machine.  
In the medical domain there is also a cost associated with not delivering care, 
for example where the remoteness of a region or lack of available SQEP caregiv-
ers means healthcare access is limited. In these situations the introduction of ASs 
to perform diagnostic functionality or allow minimally invasive surgery may not 
replace an existing human capability. This differs from the automotive domain, 
where the transport capability is generally understood to be already in place (i.e. 
human drivers). An ethical question in the medical domain therefore might con-
cern whether the risk posed by an AS is justifiable in the absence of any existing 
capability for diagnosis and treatment. To a lesser extent this is also the question 
when considering assLVWLYH³FRPSDQLRQ´$6WHFKQRORJLHVWKHPDLQUROHIRUWKHVH
may be in situations where no human caregivers are available. 
Privacy is also a significant ethical question in the medical domain. While 
risks may be reduced by sharing medical information (e.g. with other systems, 
with healthcare practitioners), this must be balanced against the privacy require-
ments of an individual.  
Further ethical complexities include the possibility of skills degradation 
(whereby human actors lose their diagnostic and treatment skills), diagnostic ca-
pabilities and side-effects. In particular, ethical complexities around autonomous 
diagnostic devices involve the possibility of false negatives (resulting in treat-
ment being erroneously withheld) and false positives (treatment will be given 
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unnecessarily). While false negatives have an obvious safety impact, false posi-
tives can trigger medical intervention or further potentially harmful diagnostic 
tests.  
2.3 Defence 
In the defence domain, there are a number of ethical concerns relating to the ac-
ceptability of ASs. One of these relates to the ability of such systems to make a 
firing decision, with armed sentry systems being an example of these. Ethical 
concerns may include whether it is justifiable to fire on friendly troops, the impact 
of mistaken identity and the conditions under which civilian casualties are ac-
ceptable (Lin 2008). 
Even where systems do not autonomously make target engagement decisions, 
there is an ethical concern over such systems as a replacement for humans in 
combat situations. It has been argued that human operators of UAVs may be more 
willing to engage targets, because of a distancing effect due to the geographical 
distance between them (Borenstein 2008) This presents an ethical disincentive to 
the introduction of such systems. However, by contrast, ASs would not be subject 
to the extreme stress human soldiers are placed under, and so may be less likely 
to contravene rules of engagement (Lin 2008). 
On a larger scale, it has also been suggested that the use of military AS systems 
subverts casualty aversion (Walsh and Schulzke 2015). Casualty aversion is an 
ethical constraint resulting from public reluctance to support a given military ac-
tion due to the human cost. In this way the use of such ASs can be seen to create 
a moral hazard, in removing the risk associated with their actions. One conse-
quence of this may be that the introduction of ASs in the defence domain could 
potentially lead to an increase in conflict frequency due to public willingness to 
encourage this. However, this could also lead to an increased willingness to un-
dertake conflict for humanitarian reasons.  
2.4 Systems of ethics  
While we do not attempt to provide an exhaustive background to ethical philos-
ophies, the following ethical theories provide relevant terminology. 
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2.4.1 Consequentialism 
Consequentialism (Goodall 2014) is an ethical theory which prioritises outcomes: 
consequentialist ethics deems acts to be morally acceptable if they lead to a good 
RXWFRPH7KLVLVVRPHWLPHVVXPPDULVHGDV³WKHHQGMXVWLILHVWKHPHDQV´$FRQ
sequentialist approach to AS safety would be to seek to reduce overall harm (e.g. 
by minimising the number of people harmed; a consequentialist solution to the 
trolley problem would be to switch the trolley onto the track with a single person). 
Consequentialism as an ethical theory is aligned with more general safety criteria 
(Health and Safety Executive 2001). in terms of minimising harm, but does not 
take into account questions of risk responsibility, informed consent for ac-
ceptance of risk and calculations relating to acceptable exposure due to work. 
2.4.2 Deontological 
By contrast, deontological theories of ethics prioritise acting in accordance with 
explicitly stated duties and rules (Goodall 2014). Deontological ethics therefore 
does not require the AS to consider the outcomes, but merely to act in accordance 
with pre-programmed rules (which may include, for example, a rule that the AS 
must not injure ± or cause to be injured ± any person). While encoding such rules 
is conceptually simpler than requiring the AS to perform calculations minimising 
harm, deontological ethics does require the identification of rules for every situ-
ation the AS may find itself in. A deontological approach to the trolley problem 
would be to consider whether rules exist which govern the acceptability of 
switching the trolley to a different track, regardless of the risk exposure to any 
individuals. 
2.4.3 Virtue ethics 
A third ethical imperative relevant to ASs is the concept of virtue ethics, typically 
presented in terms of self-sacrifice (Lin 2015). This discusses the extent to which 
an AS should choose to act altruistically, according to some stated definition of 
this. An automotive AS adhering to virtue ethics would choose to sacrifice itself 
and its passenger in order to reduce harm to a third party, while a military AS 
adhering to virtue ethics would potentially be of questionable utility. 
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3 Ethics and risk  
One of the fundamental issues identified in all domains at the intersection of eth-
ics and safety is the question of risk transfer. Although it may be possible to argue 
that the introduction of ASs in certain situations reduces the overall harm, from 
an ethical perspective this may not be sufficient. This is because if risk is trans-
ferred away from some exposed people and placed on others then the transfer 
must be explicitly justified, even where the overall risk is reduced.  
In more detail, it may be the case that introduction of ASs causes a segment 
of the population to face either an absolute or a relative increase in the proportion 
of risk which they bear. An example of this can be seen in the trolley problem: 
consider an AS which causes fewer collisions, but uniformly chooses to impact 
smaller pedestrians when a collision is unavoidable. Such an AS would cause 
these pedestrians to bear a disproportionate amount of the overall risk, when com-
pared to a human driver. The medical domain also provides examples of this, 
most notably compulsory vaccination programs. These reduce overall mortality 
by promoting herd immunity, but a small number of vulnerable individuals are 
harmed by the vaccine. In this example, overall risk has been reduced, but the 
individuals in question are exposed to an increase in the proportion of that risk 
which they bear. 
The question of consent is also relevant, in that exposed parties have not nec-
essarily consented to bearing the portion of risk allocated to them. In the military 
domain, affected civilians may not even be aware that ASs are in use, while in 
the medical, automotive and rail domains it is more likely to be the case that 
exposed parties are unaware of the principles governing AS behaviour. It is ar-
guable that in some domains, such as automotive, an explanation of the ethical 
behaviour of the AS should form part of the product certification. 
A further concern is the impact of ASs when considered from a systems of 
systems (SoS) perspective. Whether the wider system relates to rail, to the road 
QHWZRUNWRDSDWLHQW¶VRYHUDOOPHGLFDOFDUHRUWRGHIHQFHFDSDELOLW\ASs com-
prise only one component within an interconnected system. Potential interactions 
with other ASs must be considered, as well as interactions with infrastructure, 
human operators and third parties. Particularly where ASs make use of machine 
learning algorithms, there is the potential for unforeseen interactions and emer-
gent behaviour. For example, in the automotive domain we may see an increase 
in traffic jams due to all AVs following the same route, as it is in the interest of 
no individual AV to change route. Local optimisations made by ASs in the med-
ical domain may cause patients to be sent for unnecessary scans and treatments, 
while in the defence domain automating the task of learning which targets are 
acceptable ± and basing target engagement decisions off these ± is likely to pre-
sent significant concerns. More generally, there may be an issue if different eth-
ical imperatives are embedded within different systems which interact. It may not 
be possible for these systems to coexist in an ethically compatible manner. 
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3.1 Risk balancing and risk transfer 
If risk transfer is understood to be the foundation for these concerns then the 
ethical problems can be rephrased in terms of the trade-off associated with reduc-
ing one risk posed by an AS at the potential cost of increasing another risk. This 
gives us the ability to discuss ethics ± at least partially ± in the language of safety. 
In general, for any given (autonomous or non-autonomous) system there may 
be multiple ways to reduce the overall risk posed to As Low As Reasonably Prac-
ticable (ALARP). Individual risks can be traded-off, or balanced against each 
other, where an increase in one risk is accepted in return for a decrease in another. 
This concept is discussed in standards primarily within the nuclear domain (HSE 
2006) (ONR 2013), which emphasise the need to balance individual risks within 
a system and consider established good practice. However, outside this domain 
many safety guidance documents (HSE 2001) provide little information on how 
to balance risks and make these choices, requiring only that the overall system 
risk should be ALARP.  
Risk trade-offs and balances can happen at three levels throughout system de-
velopment. At the development level these are relatively common, as many de-
velopment choices imply that a decision must be taken between the risks associ-
ated with each possible approach. For example, choosing to develop software in 
C instead of SPARK ADA may provide increased access to experienced devel-
opers, but at the cost of static analysability.  
At the system level, as discussed, one risk posed by the system may be miti-
gated at the cost of potentially increasing another. Finally, at the external level, 
an increased safety risk may be associated with a benefit in another domain, such 
as security. This is discussed further in Section 4.5. 
4 Risk Profiles 
In (Menon et al. 2013) we presented a number of different risk reduction ap-
proaches, or risk profiles, which provide alternative ways of balancing individual 
risks in order to achieve an ALARP system risk. An ontology of these is briefly 
given below. It is unlikely that a single risk profile will be suitable for balancing 
all system risks, and therefore we would recommend that these profiles be com-
bined and customised as needed.  
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4.2 Fairness in improvement 
The aim of this approach is to achieve a similar absolute risk reduction for all 
individual risks. A fairness in improvement approach prioritises the reduction of 
all risks $%«1 regardless of the relative cost of these reductions (provided 
these are reasonably practicable), and regardless of whether making these reduc-
tions to one risk A means that for technical reasons further reductions cannot then 
be made to another risk B. Using a fairness in improvement approach can mean 
that no individual risk is as low as technically possible when considered in isola-
tion. However, this approach ensures that the risk reduction effort confers a cer-
tain minimum benefit on all system risks.  
A fairness in improvement approach for AS risk reduction may correspond to 
attempting to mimic the actions and risk reduction behaviour exhibited by a hu-
man actor. The risks posed by the AS will therefore bear a similar proportionate 
relationship to each other as the risks posed by a human actor, although the over-
all system risk may be lower. In the military and automotive domains, this may 
correspond to emphasising the need for AS functionality to match human behav-
iour (e.g. in a trolley problem scenario, or when making firing decisions). In the 
situations encountered in the medical domain where no comparable human actor 
is available, this would require balancing the risks associated with incorrect di-
agnoses or surgery against the risks associated with a lack of treatment. 
4.3 Fairness in outcome 
The aim of this approach is to achieve a similar level of risk for all individual 
risks. Fairness in outcome means that our risk reduction attempts prioritise the 
reduction of a more severe risk A over the reduction of a less severe risk B. This 
is not affected by the relative cost of reducing risks A and B compared to each 
other, or whether making these reductions to A means that for technical reasons 
further reductions cannot be made to B. Using a fairness in outcome approach 
can imply that the risk reduction efforts are concentrated on only a few risks, with 
no benefit for the other risks. However, a benefit of this approach ensures that the 
areas of greatest risk are targeted by reduction efforts.  
A fairness in outcome approach for AS risk reduction may correspond to a 
focus on reducing the greatest risks posed by the AS. In the case of the automotive 
domain this presents a solution to some manifestations of trolley problem: impact 
with other vehicles is likely, for example, to be a preferred hazard over impact 
with pedestrians. It is worth noting that Google have adopted a partial fairness in 
outcome approach, stating that their priority is to avoid impacting unprotected 
road users (Automotive IQ 2017).   
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4.4 Long-term risk benefit 
The question of system risks that change over time can also be relevant when 
balancing individual risks. Standards such as (HSE 2006) also consider the pos-
sibility of accepting a higher short-term risk if this results in a long-term risk 
reduction. 
For AS risk reduction, taking a long-term risk benefit approach prioritises the 
introduction of ASs, along with any concomitant short-term increase in risk, 
should it be possible to demonstrate that this would lead to fewer lives being lost 
over the long-term. Long-term risk benefit requires explicit justification within 
the safety case, as it may not be possible to demonstrate that in the short term the 
system risk is ALARP. Consequently, long-term risk benefit should be used only 
to customise and refine other risk profiles. 
4.5 External risk transfer 
Risk transfer refers to the situation where multiple components or subsystems 
interact, such as within a SoS. In this case, an ALARP claim for each subsystem 
considered in isolation does not necessarily lead to the lowest overall system risk. 
In these situations an increase in a local risk associated with one system may be 
accepted in return for a decrease in the risk associated with the wider system. 
This is presented in further detail in (Menon et al. 2013). 
More generally, in some cases an increase in a safety risk may result in a ben-
efit in an external domain. For example, the presence of certain security features 
such as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) provides a security advantage while 
making it harder to demonstrate the safety of the system (amongst other concerns, 
IDS need to be regularly updated, which is difficult given the rigorous testing and 
validation required by safety-critical systems (Johnson 2014)). It should be noted, 
however, that this external risk transfer cannot be deemed acceptable from an 
ALARP perspective, as the ALARP principle does not consider benefits outside 
the safety domain. 
5 Safety, ethics and development 
Risk profiles allow us to bring safety and ethics together for AS behaviour by 
making explicit the risk balancing and trade-offs inherent in any ethical decision. 
It will also be necessary to justify these decisions, both from an ethical and a 
safety perspective. In order for all stakeholders to adequately understand the im-
plications of these decisions we propose that the argument be presented within 
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DQH[SOLFLW³HWKLFVFDVH´FRPSDUDEOHWR± and cross-referencing ± the safety case. 
In this section we discuss how such a case may be constructed.  
5.1 Engineering and implemented ethics 
When referring to ASs development and operation there are two interrelated but 
distinct applications of ethics and ethical systems. The first of these we will term 
engineering ethics and the second implemented ethics (or machine ethics, in AI 
terminology).  
Engineering ethics refers to the ethical principles adhered to by engineers dur-
ing system and software development. These may be in the form of principles or 
codes of conduct formalised by a professional organisation (RAEng 2017). They 
typically include criteria such as honesty, integrity, respect for law and the public 
interest, accuracy, rigour, fairness, objectivity and leadership. In addition, they 
encourage further thought and assessment to determine if any given engineering 
action is ethically defensible. It is important to note that adherence to a code of 
engineering ethics does not, in itself, mean that the behaviour of any resultant 
system will necessarily be considered ethical by all stakeholders. However, ad-
herence to a code of engineering ethics helps to support arguments about the be-
haviour and properties of the system by providing confidence in the integrity of 
any lifecycle artefacts. Should developers not adhere to any professional code of 
ethics, any argument about the safety of the system or its behaviour can only be 
weakly supported. 
Implemented ethics (or machine ethics), by contrast, refer to the ethics which 
govern the behaviour of the AS itself. These include deciding whether to priori-
tise the safety of the AS and its operator over third parties, deciding what func-
tionality to deploy in given situations (e.g. target engagement decisions), decid-
ing which of multiple third parties to prioritise where harm is inevitable, as well 
as making decisions related to the balance between safety, security, privacy and 
trust.  
Unlike engiQHHULQJHWKLFV WKHUHPD\QRWEHFRQVHQVXVRQZKDW WKH ³ULJKW´
implemented ethics are. Acceptable ethical behaviour will vary across different 
societies (including different countries) as well as different domains of use.  
6 Ethics case and argumentation 
As with safety arguments, there is no single method of creating a failsafe argu-
ment to support claims relating to AS ethics. However, there do exist some 
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generalised ethical foundations (IEEE Global Initiative 2016) relevant to all as-
pects of an AS. 
In order to reflect our focus on ethics affecting safety, we propose the follow-
ing principles to demonstrate the ethical integrity of the system. These echo the 
principles governing the integrity of Programmable Electronics (PE) in Annex D 
of (MOD 2015), and are aligned with the ethical foundations of (IEEE Global 
Initiative 2016). 
 
Principle P1: Ethics requirements governing the AS behaviour shall be defined. 
Principle P2: The intent of the ethics requirements shall be maintained through-
out decomposition. 
Principle P3: Ethics requirements shall be satisfied. 
Principle P4: Any AS behaviours which conflict with the ethics requirements 
³HWKLFDOO\KD]DUGRXV´EHKDYLRXUVVKDOOEHLGHQWLILHGDQGPLWLJDWHG 
 
(MOD 2015) defines one further principle relating to the confidence which 
has been achieved in addressing the PE safety principles. An analogy in the ethics 
domain would be the definition of an ethics proportionality principle and recom-
mendations as to how this may be achieved or demonstrated. This is at present 
beyond the scope of this work.   
We present a method of incorporating these principles into an ethics case ar-
gument, which aligns with the ethical foundations identified in (IEEE Global In-
itiative) as well as relevant safety and legal criteria (HSE 2001). The overall claim 
is: 
 
G0: The behaviour of the AS is ethically appropriate for its proposed context of 
use. 
 
This claim is supported by five sub-claims:  
 
A1: Engineering ethics are adequately defined, implemented and adhered to dur-
ing the development lifecycle. 
B1: Implemented ethics are adequately specified and comply with the legal, so-
cial and ethical norms of the environment of use. 
C1: The intent of the implemented ethics shall be maintained through decompo-
sition into AS design requirements and risk management decisions. 
D1: Behavioural outcomes of the implemented ethics are satisfied. 
E1: Any conflicts between the AS behaviour and the implemented ethics are 
identified and mitigated so far as is reasonably practicable 
 
The following sections address each of these claims in further detail. 
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6.1 Claim A1 
A1: Engineering ethics are adequately defined, implemented and adhered to dur-
ing the development lifecycle. 
The purpose of this claim is to demonstrate that the engineering codes of prac-
tice and prescribed ethical principles are not compromised or impacted by any 
decisions relating to the ethical behaviour which it is decided the AS should 
demonstrate.  
The desired engineering ethics may be identified by referencing codes of con-
duct, domain good practice and relevant previous decisions and their adequacy 
should be justified. Evidence to support this claim may be in the form of Contin-
uing Professional Development records, audit records, lifecycle artefacts, docu-
mented processes and policies and so forth. 
6.2 Claim B1 
B1: Implemented ethics are adequately specified, and comply with the legal, so-
cial and ethical norms of the environment of use. 
This claim fulfils principle P1, and for clarity of argument may be usefully 
broken down as shown in the following template example.  
B2: The implemented ethics are adequately specified. 
This specification may be in the form of references out to legal documents, to 
standards and policies, to previous system design decisions, records of public 
consultations and so forth. The specification of implemented ethics must be suf-
ficient to address all issues raised in Section 5.1, as well as to provide a justifica-
tion that the issues under discussion are sufficient and complete.  
B3: The implemented ethics comply with the legal, social and ethical norms of 
the environment of use. 
As stated in (IEEE Global Initiative 2016), the norms of the relevant commu-
nity (or environment of use) must be considered when assessing the behaviour of 
the AS. The implemented ethics must be compatible with these norms. It should 
be noted that this does not mean that an AS should behave in exactly the same 
way as a human actor (that is, the implemented ethics do not have to be identical 
to the ethics currently embedded within the environment of use), but the two must 
be compatible, and any discrepancies identified and a justification provided. 
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6.3 Claim C1 
C1: The intent of the implemented ethics shall be maintained through decompo-
sition into AS design requirements and risk management decisions. 
This claim fulfils principles P2, and for clarity of argument may be usefully 
broken down as shown in the following template example.  
C2: System design and AS functionality are adequately specified. 
This sub-claim should be supported with evidence relating to the system de-
sign and implementation. Its intent is to demonstrate that the AS system design 
is specified sufficiently well enough to reduce the likelihood of unexpected be-
haviours. Should the intended behaviour or the design of the AS be underspeci-
fied, then it becomes much harder to predict whether the resultant operational 
actions of the AV will be considered ethically acceptable. 
C3: Design decisions and risk management decisions are informed by the speci-
fied implemented ethics. 
This claim fulfils Principle P2 and should be supported by nomination and 
definition of a specified risk profile (customised if required, as described in Sec-
tion 4). It must also be demonstrated that this risk profile reflects the desired im-
plemented ethics. The nomination of a risk profile, with the consequent require-
ment that describes a mechanism for reducing the system risk ALARP, is neces-
sary in order to ensure that the specified implemented ethics do not contradict 
any of the legal requirements around safety (HSE 2001).  
For example, should the implemented ethics require that the AS behaviour 
mimic the behaviour of a human actor (thereby resulting in no change in relative 
risk distribution across the wider system from the replacement of human actors 
wiWK$6VWKHQZHZRXOGH[SHFWWRVHHD³IDLUQHVVLQLPSURYHPHQW´ULVNSURILOH
selected. In practice, the desired implemented ethics are likely to be sufficiently 
complex such that a significant amount of customisation is needed to any of the 
risk profiles of Section 4. 
Secondly, this claim should be supported with evidence that the risk manage-
ment and risk reduction decisions reflect the selected risk profile. In practice, this 
may best be done by referring out to individual claims in the safety argument and 
demonstrating how the risk prioritisation decisions have been reflected in the mit-
igations. 
6.4 Claim D1 
Claim D1: Behavioural outcomes of the implemented ethics are satisfied. 
This claim fulfils Principle P3. Satisfaction of it first requires the identification 
of what behaviours from the AS are required by the implemented ethics princi-
ples. These may not be immediately obvious and it is likely that some textual 
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analysis of these ethics will need to be performed. Demonstrating that the AS 
performs such behaviours is likely to involve significant evidence in the form of 
system verification and validation, which may be cross-referenced from the 
safety case. Traceability between high and low level functional and non-func-
tional requirements must also be demonstrated, as must traceability between 
these requirements and verification.  
6.5 Claim E1 
Claim E1: Any conflicts between the AS behaviour and the implemented ethics 
are identified and mitigated so far as is reasonably practicable. 
This claim fulfils Principle P4 and is accounted for by the fact that, like safety, 
ethics is a limit concept (Habli et al. 2015). Just as a system cannot be guaranteed 
to be absolutely safe, it cannot be guaranteed to be absolutely ethical (this is ex-
acerbated by the difficulty in adequately specifying a comprehensive set of ethi-
cal principles).  
This claim should therefore be supported by a gap analysis of the AS behav-
iour and the behaviour that would be expected according to the implemented eth-
ics (claim B1). Any gaps ± conflicts of the AS behaviour and the implemented 
ethics ± may be thereby identified and efforts made to mitigate them. It is unlikely 
that the AS behaviour will be fully defined, and hence any gaps or conflicts may 
need to be derived from the functional and non-functional requirements and the 
implemented ethics. Equally, it is very likely that the implemented ethics will not 
exhaustively describe all possible behaviours of the AS; some of these may even 
have no ethical implications. For any identified conflicts (ethically hazardous be-
haviours), the argument must demonstrate that mitigations have been put in place 
to reduce the effect of these conflicts so far as is reasonably practicable. This 
parallels the ALARP requirement for safety, and similar argument techniques 
may be used. 
7 Conclusions 
In this paper we have identified the ethical landscape and imperatives that govern 
discussion of AS behaviour across multiple domains. We have introduced and 
formalised the concept of risk trade-offs, and considered the ethical drivers be-
hind these. We have also identified the need for transparency in risk balances and 
risk trade-offs in order that consent from stakeholders may be obtained. 
We have presented a methodology for arguing that the behaviour of an AS 
meets ethical criteria deemed relevant to safety. This methodology draws on 
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aspects of safety argumentation to support a number of claims relating to the def-
inition of ethically acceptable behaviour, the applicability of this in the proposed 
environment and the design decisions made during AS development. We draw 
on the concept of risk profiles to transform ethical principles into the language of 
safety and to provide a foundation for discussing how our ethical principles im-
pact our risk mitigation decisions.  
We distinguish between the principles of ethical conduct constraining the pro-
fessional actions of engineers, and the principles of ethics constraining the be-
haviour of the systems these engineers design. We recognise that ethics of system 
behaviour, like safety, is a limit concept and extend the consideration of ALARP 
into the ethical domain. This allows us to examine whether the behaviour demon-
strated by the AS is sufficiently close to the ethically desired behaviour in the 
environment of use. 
There is the potential for significant further work in this area, particularly in 
the areas of balancing risk trade-offs. It would be of value to further extend the 
ontology of risk profiles to consider which refinements are of most use across 
multiple domains. There is scope for considering the extent to which safety, se-
curity, ethics, trust, legal and regulatory factors interact, and how the require-
ments of these can be balanced for a general autonomous system. In addition, 
there is currently an area of work relating to confidence in the satisfaction of 
ethics requirements, which may have an analogy to confidence in the satisfaction 
of safety requirements; further research in this area would go some way towards 
addressing this. 
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